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Highlights: 
 Epistemic trust, mentalization, and language develop within early attachment relationships 
 Epistemic trust supports psychosocial development and educational attainment 
 SLPs may have a role in supporting clients to develop epistemic trust 
 Research is needed into links between epistemic trust and language skills 
 
 
Abstract:  
This paper provides an introduction to epistemic trust for speech-language pathologists (SLPs). 
‘Epistemic trust’ describes a specific form of trust that an individual places in others when learning 
about the world, particularly the social world. To date, the relevance of epistemic trust to SLP 
clinical practice has received little theoretical or empirical attention. The aim of this paper is to 
define epistemic trust and explain its relationship with parent-child attachment and mentalization 
which have, in turn, been linked with language development and use. Suggestions are made for 
ways in which SLPs may encourage epistemic trusts in clients, emphasizing the need to establish 
strong therapeutic alliances. The authors conclude that epistemic trust is an important consideration 
for SLPs and that further research exploring the relationship between epistemic trust and language 
skills is needed to better understand the interplay of these variables and inform clinical practice.   
 
Key words:  Epistemic trust, Mentalization, Theory of Mind, Language, Speech-Language 
Pathology 
 
Learning Objectives: 
Readers will be able to: (1) define epistemic trust, (2) recognize the importance of mentalization 
skills in developing epistemic trust, (3) identify the key communication behaviors which support 
the development of epistemic trust within the early parent-child attachment relationship, (4) 
understand the associations between epistemic trust and language development and use, (5) 
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understand the role of epistemic trust in clients’ capacity to engage in interventions provided by 
SLPs, and (6) recognize ways in which SLPs may support epistemic mistrust and foster epistemic 
trust in clients.   
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1.  Introduction 
      Much of the information children and adults learn about the world comes from communicating 
with others (Gweon, Pelton, Konopka, & Schulz, 2014; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  This highlights 
the importance of language and communication to learning, but it also raises the question, “How 
does one know whom, and what, information to trust?” ‘Epistemic trust’ describes an individual’s 
capacity to trust that the knowledge provided by others is “…trustworthy, generalizable, and 
relevant to the self” (Fonagy & Allison, 2014, p. 373).  
      Two theories underpin the construct of epistemic trust: attachment theory (Fonagy, Luyten, & 
Allison, 2015) and ‘mentalization’ (Fonagy & Allison, 2014), also referred to as ‘Theory of Mind’ 
(ToM) (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008).  With a large body of literature revealing links between 
language and: parent-child attachment (e.g., Belsky & Fearon, 2002), ToM (e.g., Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; Nilsson & de López, 2016), and mentalization (e.g., Rutherford et al., 2012), a lack 
of epistemic trust may be a clinical concern for some individuals attending SLP clinics.  Despite 
theoretical links, this topic has, to date, received little attention in the literature. In the following 
sections, epistemic trust is defined, the association between epistemic trust and mentalization is 
explored, and the development of epistemic trust within the parent-child attachment relationship is 
described.  The possible links between epistemic trust and language are then elucidated. The clinical 
relevance of epistemic trust to SLPs is discussed and suggestions are made for managing epistemic 
mistrust and encouraging epistemic trust in clients. Finally, recommendations are made regarding 
the need for research in this field. 
 
2. Epistemic trust 
      Functioning in the world requires an individual to understand a vast amount of information (Liu, 
Vanderbilt, & Heyman, 2013). Imagine you are in a supermarket and cannot find an item you need. 
You could continue to look, walking down aisles, looking along shelves. You may eventually find 
the item, but looking by yourself would take time. Alternatively, you could ask someone for 
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assistance. Many would agree that the best person to ask is not a fellow shopper, but, rather, a 
supermarket employee, because the employee presumably has expertise in finding grocery items. 
You approach the service counter and there are two employees: one looks grumpy, the other is 
smiling. Are you going to keep looking by yourself? If you ask for help, which supermarket 
employee will you ask?  The decision you make regarding whether to ask for help and whom you 
would ask in this scenario may depend upon whether you have developed epistemic trust, which is 
the ability to readily accept information and help from others. Epistemic trust enables more efficient 
learning than trying to gain all knowledge on one’s own (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).   
      Developing epistemic trust also involves recognizing that learning from others may have 
drawbacks. For example, an informant may provide inaccurate information, or provide only partial 
or deceptive information (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009).  To avoid being misinformed, learners are 
wise to be sceptical about information (Sperber et al., 2010). This scepticism is referred to as 
epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Sperber et al. (2010) have argued that epistemic 
vigilance is a safeguard against being misinformed or deceived by others, which “…is likely to have 
evolved biologically alongside the ability to communicate in the way that humans do” (p. 361). 
Fonagy and Allison (2014) have proposed that epistemic vigilance is reduced, over time, through 
supportive early parent-child interactions involving key communication behaviors, allowing 
epistemic trust to develop. These communication behaviors (discussed in detail in a later section) 
signal to the infant that the information which follows will be culturally-valid, relevant knowledge 
which the infant needs (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016; Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  
      Individuals who have been unable to develop epistemic trust remain wary of learning (i.e., are in 
a state of epistemic mistrust), potentially limiting psycho-social (Fonagy et al., 2015) and 
educational development (Durkin & Shafto, 2016). Under some conditions, such as those involving 
child abuse and neglect, epistemic vigilance can become excessive, leading to epistemic 
hypervigilance (Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  An individual in a state of epistemic mistrust, or the 
more severe, epistemic hypervigilance, may have difficulty developing rapport with others, may be 
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reluctant to take on-board new information, and may misperceive others’ intentions as threatening 
or malevolent (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016). As epistemic trust supports an individual to learn from 
others, particularly about the social world, it is plausible that some individuals who fail to develop 
epistemic trust may experience difficulty learning from others which may impact the learning of 
language.  To date, however, there has been no research exploring associations between epistemic 
trust and language skills. If an association between epistemic trust and language was identified, this 
finding may have important implications for SLP clinical practice. Potential clinical implications of 
epistemic trust for SLPs are discussed in more detail in a later section.  
 
3. Epistemic trust and mentalization 
      In order to develop epistemic trust, one must be able to mentalize (Knox, 2016). ‘Mentalization’ 
is the capacity to identify ‘mental states’ - the thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of one’s self and others 
(Bo et al., 2017a; Bo, Sharp, Fonagy, & Kongerslev, 2017b; Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  First 
proposed by Fonagy (1991), mentalization extended the concept of ToM (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978).  Whereas ToM relates to the cognitive abilities that permit an individual to identify others’ 
mental states in order to interpret others’ behavior, mentalization  is focussed on understanding the 
mental states of both the self and others, and emphasizes the role of affect (emotions and feelings) 
in that understanding (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008). The terms ‘mentalization’ and ‘theory of 
mind’ are often used interchangeably in the literature, and are akin to the concepts of ‘mind-
reading’ (Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2002), ‘reflective function’ (Fonagy & Bateman, 
2016), or ‘mind-mindedness’ (Laranjo, Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2010).                        
      Epistemic trust relies on mentalization as the capacity to mentalize permits an individual, when 
deciding whether or not to trust, to infer information about an informant’s knowledge and intentions. 
The capacity to infer informants’ beliefs and perspectives is critical in avoiding misinformation or 
deception (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  There is research demonstrating that children as young as 
four years of age attempt to understand others’ mental states, knowledge, and intent, when judging 
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the trustworthiness of information (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 
2012).  In the following section, the development of epistemic trust within the early parent-child 
attachment relationship is discussed. 
 
4. Early attachment relationships and the development of epistemic trust 
      Responsive and attuned caregiving within the early parent-child attachment relationship is 
fundamental to the development of attachment security, as well as to the acquisition of 
mentalization and formation of epistemic trust (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; Fonagy et al., 2015; 
Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Rutherford et al., 2012).  Attachment Theory, initially proposed by John 
Bowlby, is concerned with the nature of the relationship between infants and caregivers (Macbeth, 
Gumley, Schwannauer, & Fisher, 2011). Based on the nature of the interactions with caregivers, 
infants develop attachment relationships which are either secure or insecure.  Three insecure 
patterns of attachment have been identified in childhood: avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized 
(see Hardy, 2007, for further discussion of attachment patterns). Experiences with caregivers, over 
numerous interactions, lead the infant to develop an ‘internal working model’. This model, first 
proposed by John Bowlby, refers to an individual’s mental representation of his/herself and his/her 
relationship with others (Korver-Nieberg, Berry, Meijer, & de Haan, 2014). 
      As in the development of attachment security, it has been postulated that emotionally-
responsive caregiving reduces epistemic vigilance and supports development of epistemic trust 
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014). Furthermore, the trust children place in their primary caregiver can 
extend to how well they trust others (Barth, Bhandari, Garcia, MacDonald, & Chase, 2014; Brooker 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Landrum, Eaves Jr, & Shafto, 2015). Empirical evidence exists for the 
relationship between attachment security and epistemic trust. In a frequently-cited study by 
Corriveau et al. (2009), 147 toddlers, aged between 50 and 61 months, were given information by 
their mothers and a stranger. Children with secure attachments were likely to trust their mothers 
when their mothers’ claims were credible, but agreed with the stranger and their own perception if 
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the mother gave a counter-intuitive label to an item. Children with avoidant attachments, tended to 
mistrust the mother in neutral or ambiguous conditions but showed confidence in their own belief. 
Anxiously-attached toddlers were likely to agree with the mother even when the mother’s claims 
were counter-intuitive. Children whose attachment had been disorganized in infancy tended to 
mistrust their own experience, the mother’s view, and the stranger’s view. They had an insoluble 
dilemma regarding whose information could be trusted.   
      Within the attachment relationship, development of mentalization and epistemic trust are 
fostered through the caregiver’s use of key communication behaviors (Csibra, 2010; Fonagy et al., 
2015; Gergely & Csibra, 2005). These communication behaviors are: ‘marked mirroring’, 
‘contingent responsiveness’, ‘ostensive cueing’, and ‘mentalizing language’. Each of these 
communication behaviors is explained separately below, though it is important to note that these 
behaviors are typically demonstrated together within a secure attachment relationship.   
      ‘Marked mirroring’ involves a caregiver using exaggerated facial expression, vocalization, and 
gesture (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002) in an attempt to mirror (reflect or represent) the 
infant’s experience. For example, consider the facial expression shown by a parent looking at their 
distressed infant. The parent would display worry or concern; however, the parent’s facial 
expression is different to the one she/he would display if she/he were personally distressed (Fonagy 
& Allison, 2014).  The parent adopts a ‘marked’ expression (exaggerated, like play-acting) and the 
infant recognizes that the caregiver is representing the infant’s, and not the caregiver’s own mental 
state; thus, the infant does not become confused about whether the display represents her/his own, 
or the caregiver’s, response (Knox, 2016).  The infant’s experience of seeing his/her emotions 
demonstrated by the caregiver allows the infant to discover that he/she is a being with intentions 
and feelings of his/her own, separate from others (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007). This 
discovery is necessary for the development of mentalization (Bo et al., 2017b) which, as discussed 
earlier, underpins development of epistemic trust (Knox, 2016).  
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      ‘Contingent responsiveness’ is another key communication behavior shown by caregivers 
within a secure attachment relationship. Contingent responsiveness requires caregivers to react in a 
manner which is consistent with the infant’s needs; that is, the nature of the caregiver’s response is 
‘contingent’ upon the infant’s experience (Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  For example, a caregiver will 
smile at her/his contented infant, but will be concerned when her/his infant is distressed.  
Contingent responsiveness on the part of caregivers leads infants to develop a positive internal 
working model, viewing caregivers as consistent, appropriate, and emotionally available, and the 
self as worthy of this care (Dykas & Cassidy, 2011), permitting epistemic trust to develop (Fonagy 
& Allison, 2014). Conversely, if an infant experiences frequent inconsistency in caregiving (as in 
situations of child abuse and/or neglect) the infant may develop a sense that her/his needs will not 
be adequately met, impairing the development of epistemic trust (Bo et al., 2017b). 
      The third communication behavior critical for developing epistemic trust is the use of ‘ostensive 
cues’. Ostensive cues, including eye gaze, pointing, and ‘infant-directed speech’, enable fast and 
efficient transfer of information from parents to infants (Gergely & Csibra, 2005). Infant-directed 
speech (also known as ‘motherese’ or ‘parentese’) is a specific pattern of speech – a slower, higher-
pitched, exaggerated way of speaking to infants which is thought to be almost universal across 
cultures (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).  The use of ostensive cues by parents is complemented by the 
infant’s innate receptivity towards these cues (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2005). 
For example, newborns prefer to look at a face gazing directly at them, rather than at a face with 
averted gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). Ostensive cues help an infant to ‘tune in’ 
to the caregiver and accept the information given (Fonagy et al., 2015). SLPs would recognize this 
‘tuning in’ as a component of ‘joint attention’, defined by Morales et al. (2000) as “…the capacity 
of an infant to coordinate her attention with a social partner vis a vis an object or event” (p. 283).  
Joint attention aids learning as it helps an infant direct his/her attention to the caregiver and/or the 
object the caregiver is talking about. If used appropriately, ostensive cues reduce infants’ epistemic 
vigilance and trigger epistemic trust (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; Fonagy et al., 2015) by alerting an 
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infant to the fact that the caregiver is about to communicate something important to him/her 
(Fonagy et al., 2007).  
      The fourth communication behavior which assists development of epistemic trust is the 
caregiver’s use of mentalizing language with her/his infant, often called ‘maternal mind-
mindedness’ (Laranjo et al., 2010). Maternal mind-mindedness refers to caregivers describing 
mental states (beliefs, feelings, and perspectives) and using mental state language (words such as 
‘think’ and ‘want’) when communicating with their infants. The literature on mind-mindedness 
clearly supports a relationship between a parent’s use of mentalizing language and her/his child’s 
acquisition of mentalization (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Laranjo et al., 2010).  For example, Laranjo 
et al. (2010) found that mothers’ earlier use of language describing mental states was related to their 
children’s ToM understanding at 2 years of age.   Similarly, Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) 
found that a mother’s use of mental state language with her 15-month-old child uniquely predicted 
the child's mental state language and emotion task performance at 24 months.  In a continuation of 
this study, Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) found that a mother’s reference to others’ thoughts 
and knowledge was the most consistent predictor of a child’s later mental state language at 33 
months.  As noted earlier, acquisition of the ability to mentalize is critical to the development of 
epistemic trust as mentalization enables individuals to infer and understand others’ knowledge and 
intentions, which is fundamental in deciding whether or not to trust others and the information they 
provide (Landrum et al., 2015; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  Thus, a parent’s use of mentalizing 
language in interactions with their child fosters mentalization skills in the child, which supports the 
development of epistemic trust. 
      In summary, four key communication behaviors, used by caregivers within a secure attachment 
relationship, assist infant development of both mentalization and epistemic trust. Firstly, through 
marked mirroring a baby learns about her/his emotions (Fonagy & Allison, 2014), and develops a 
sense of self as an agent separate from others (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). This provides a basis 
for mentalization, which is critical for the development of epistemic trust (Knox, 2016).  Secondly, 
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when caregivers contingently respond in ways that are attuned to their baby’s needs, the baby 
develops a sense that she/he will be cared for (a positive internal working model), fostering secure 
attachment and epistemic trust (Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  Thirdly, a caregiver’s use of ostensive 
cues (e.g., eye gaze and infant-directed speech) facilitates joint attention and epistemic trust 
(Fonagy et al., 2015; Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Luyten & Fonagy, 2016). Lastly, a caregiver’s 
mentalizing assists her/his infant’s own mentalization, (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) which is necessary 
for development of epistemic trust (Landrum et al., 2015). 
 
5. An argument for an association between epistemic trust and language skills in special 
populations 
     A direct relationship between epistemic trust and language development and use has not yet been 
investigated. In this section, three arguments are presented to support the proposal for a relationship 
between language and epistemic trust in some individuals: The first argument is based on the 
known associations between attachment and language, and between attachment and epistemic trust. 
The second argument is drawn from literature on the impact of childhood maltreatment on 
attachment, mentalizing skills, epistemic trust, and language development. The third argument 
relates to the associations between language and ToM/mentalization, on the one hand, and 
mentalization and epistemic trust, on the other hand. These three arguments are explored in more 
detail below.       
The first argument has been drawn from literature that has established associations between: (i) 
secure attachment and language development (Belsky & Fearon, 2002; Main, 1983; van IJzendoorn, 
Dijkstra, & Bus, 1995), and (ii) secure attachment and epistemic trust (Corriveau et al., 2009; 
Fonagy et al., 2007). There is a strong literature-base supporting an association between secure 
attachment and language acquisition. For example, in a quantitative meta-analysis of seven studies 
(N=303 children) which had measured attachment and language, Van IJzendoorn et al. (1995) 
concluded that “…the quality of attachment between infant and parent is quite strongly associated 
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with the infant's language development” (p. 123).  In addition, Belsky and Fearon (2002) used data 
from a large cohort study (involving 946 children) which had measured children’s attachment 
security at 15 months of age and language skills at three years of age. The authors concluded that 
“…individual differences in patterns of attachment in infancy are associated with later 
socioemotional and language development in early childhood…” (p. 306).  With respect to secure 
parent-child attachment and epistemic trust, the study by Corriveau et al. (2009) which involved 
147 toddlers, provided empirical evidence for a correlation between attachment security and 
capacity to trust others’ information (epistemic trust).  Drawing this literature together, it is feasible 
that some individuals with impaired epistemic trust may present with impaired language skills 
(especially in individuals with insecure patterns of attachment). 
      A second argument for a relationship between epistemic trust and language can be drawn from 
research showing the long-term detrimental effects of childhood maltreatment on each of the 
following: (i) the attachment relationship (Bacon & Richardson, 2001), (ii) the acquisition of 
mentalizing skills and epistemic trust (Fonagy & Bateman, 2016), and (iii) the development of 
language (Eigsti & Cicchetti, 2004). As Snow (2009) explained, child maltreatment, including 
abuse and neglect, has been associated with both expressive and receptive language difficulties. 
Child maltreatment is also known to contribute to insecure attachment, impaired mentalizing, and 
epistemic mistrust (Fonagy et al., 2015).  Based on this literature, it is likely that some SLP clients 
who present with language difficulties, and who have experienced childhood maltreatment, may 
also be affected by epistemic mistrust (or epistemic hypervigilance).   
      A third argument for a relationship between epistemic trust and language can be inferred from 
literature linking: (i) language and ToM/mentalization (e.g., Nilsson & de López, 2016) and (ii) 
mentalization and epistemic trust (Knox, 2016). Deficits in mentalization have been described in 
many clinical conditions where poor interpersonal language and communication difficulties are also 
a concern (McDonald, 2012; Westby & Robinson, 2014). Such conditions include: specific 
language impairment (SLI) (Andrés-Roqueta, Adrian, Clemente, & Katsos, 2013; Nilsson & de 
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López, 2016), autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Gökçen, Frederickson, & Petrides, 2016), 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Mary et al., 2016), schizophrenia or psychosis 
(Popolo et al., 2016), childhood traumatic/acquired brain injury (Levy & Milgram, 2016), dementia, 
(Bora, Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015), borderline personality disorder (Petersen, Brakoulias, & 
Langdon, 2016), and anxiety disorders (Colonnesi, Nikolić, de Vente, & Bögels, 2017).  Each of 
these conditions features both mentalizing and social language difficulties, and SLPs commonly 
work with individuals with these conditions.  It is reasonable to propose, therefore, that some 
individuals seen in SLP clinics for difficulties with language and social skills may also have 
impaired mentalization which, in turn, may suggest impaired epistemic trust.  It has been argued 
that SLPs have a central role in therapeutic efforts to improve ToM (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2014; 
Miller, 2006; Westby & Robinson, 2014) which, as noted previously, is akin to mentalization.  This 
paper extends this discussion to assert that, along with ToM and mentalization, understanding the 
related concept of epistemic trust is important to SLPs working with individuals with 
communication difficulties.  
      It is worth expanding, briefly, on the importance of mentalization to pragmatic and social 
language skills. Pragmatic language skills require mentalization because most verbal information is 
non-literal and requires a listener to infer a speaker’s perspective or mental state. To illustrate, 
imagine a person walking into a messy office, saying “what a tidy person you are”. In order to 
understand the speaker’s true meaning, the listener must infer that the speaker does not actually 
mean to describe the listener as tidy, but instead wants to make a point about the listener’s untidy 
habits.  In others words, a listener must ‘mentalize’ the speaker to truly understand (Bo et al., 
2017b; Champagne-Lavau & Joanette, 2009). Conversely, to effectively formulate one’s own 
message, a speaker must consider another’s perspective, that is, what the listener already knows or 
needs to know, in order to organize their message in a way that the listener will best understand 
(Binz & Brüne, 2010).  
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      In summary, while a direct relationship between epistemic trust and language has not yet been 
established, evidence from the fields of attachment theory, language development and use, theory of 
mind, and mentalization supports the existence of such an association in at least some clinical 
populations. Figure 1 depicts the known associations between language, attachment, mentalization, 
and epistemic trust, and the proposed association between language and epistemic trust.  In addition 
to the need for research regarding this proposed association, further research is needed into the 
known relationships between attachment, language, ToM/mentalization, and epistemic trust to 
better establish causality and directionality.    
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
      In this section, three arguments have been presented to support a relationship between language 
and epistemic trust. These arguments related to: individuals with insecure attachment, individuals 
who have experienced childhood abuse and neglect, and individuals with mentalizing difficulties. In 
making a case for a relationship between epistemic trust and language skills, it follows that SLPs 
may need to consider epistemic trust in their day-to-day interactions with certain clients. In the 
following sections, the importance of epistemic trust to an individual’s capacity to engage in 
therapy is discussed, and suggestions for SLP clinical practice are offered. 
 
6. Epistemic trust and clients’ therapeutic engagement 
      An important clinical implication of epistemic trust for SLPs relates to the role that epistemic 
trust plays in whether or not a client is able to engage effectively in therapy (Fonagy & Allison, 
2014). As previously outlined, epistemic trust supports an individual to trust that others are reliable 
sources of knowledge (Luyten & Fonagy, 2016).  Conversely, individuals in states of epistemic 
mistrust, or epistemic hypervigilance, often demonstrate rigidity towards new information, struggle 
to form rapport with others, and may misperceive others’ intentions as threatening or malevolent 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2016); such clients are ‘hard to reach’ in therapy (Bevington, Fuggle, & 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 15 of 31 
Fonagy, 2015). The importance of epistemic trust to the capacity to accept information given by 
others has led to a growing interest in how epistemic trust can be fostered in therapeutic settings 
(Bevington et al., 2015; Bo et al., 2017a; Bo et al., 2017b; Fonagy & Allison, 2014).   For example, 
Bo et al. (2017b) stated, “epistemic trust can arguably be reestablished through a secure therapeutic 
relationship with a therapist engaged in exploring mental states contributing to the development of 
the patient’s mentalizing abilities” (p. 176). The next section offers suggestions of ways in which 
SLPs might create conditions which help foster epistemic trust in clients. 
 
7. Preliminary suggestions for clinical practice  
      Although there is still a need for research to evidence the proposed associations, preliminary 
consideration of the potential value of these associations in clinical practice is warranted. As 
discussed in an earlier section, consideration of these associations may be particularly relevant to 
SLPs working with: i) individuals with insecure attachment, ii) individuals who have experienced 
childhood abuse and neglect, and iii) individuals with mentalizing difficulties.  As previously 
reported, attachment-based communication behaviors, such as marked mirroring, contingent 
responsiveness, ostensive cueing, and mentalizing language, enable infants’ acquisition of 
mentalization, reduce infants’ natural epistemic vigilance, and support development of epistemic 
trust (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016).  An understanding of these communication behaviors may, then, 
influence SLPs both in the manner in which they interact with clients in sessions, as well as in their 
choice of therapy activities. Each of these communication behaviors is discussed below in relation 
to how their application by SLPs may: (i) develop clients’ mentalizing skills in order to support 
clients’ development of epistemic trust, and (ii) create conditions in which clients begin to develop 
epistemic trust.  
      The first communication behavior, marked mirroring, supports mentalization and epistemic 
trust by helping an infant or young child to identify and distinguish his/her emotions and those of 
others. A SLP applying an understanding of marked mirroring may choose to identify and describe 
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a client’s emotions and facial expressions during interactions, in a manner that allows the client to 
understand that the clinician recognizes the client’s mental state. Further, a SLP may include 
activities which aim to teach clients to distinguish between their own and others’ mental states. For 
example, clients of all ages may benefit from having an experience depicted in a cartoon format, 
with thought bubbles showing the client’s own thoughts and feelings, and those of others involved 
in the event. Older children and adults may benefit from discussions about the nature of mental 
states and people’s internal world; that is, one cannot know what is in another’s mind, and others 
cannot know what is in our own minds, unless one explains or describes her/his mental states either 
verbally or non-verbally.  
      The second communication behavior, outlined earlier, was contingent responsiveness. 
Contingent responsiveness refers to the consistency with which one person responds to the needs 
and emotions of another (Fonagy & Allison, 2014). This consistency demonstrates emotional 
sensitivity and reliability which fosters epistemic trust in the infant and young child.  A SLP 
working with clients who experience a state of epistemic mistrust may apply an awareness of 
contingent responsiveness by ensuring their interactions with clients accurately and sensitively 
reflect the client’s own experience. For example, with clients of all ages, a SLP may show curiosity 
about the client’s thoughts and beliefs, and may seek to demonstrate empathy towards the client’s 
experiences (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016).  Over time, this contingent responsiveness on the part of 
the clinician can foster within the client the belief that this therapist understands and values him/her, 
and is reliable and sensitive to his/her experience – this is a necessary foundation of epistemic trust.   
      Ostensive cues, as described previously, are the third critical communication behavior shown by 
caregivers in interactions with infants and young children. Although ostensive cues are recognized 
as critical to learning in the early years of life, literature has also highlighted the importance of 
ostensive cues to the sharing of information beyond the period of early childhood (Bevington et al., 
2015; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). In addition to eye contact and joint 
attention, ostensive cues include the use of one’s name, tone of voice, and use of gesture. In the 
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authors’ clinical experience, emphasizing ostensive cues in therapy with young children can involve 
simple games to promote eye contact and the associated joint attention. In clients of various ages, 
emphasizing ostensive cues includes using a client’s name frequently, taking care to use an 
engaging tone of voice, and increasing the use of gesture, pointing, and visual materials in order to 
gain a client’s attention.  
      Ostensive cues do not only foster joint attention; they also alert an individual to the fact that the 
information to follow is of particular importance to her/him. A SLP, recognizing the role of 
ostensive cues in alerting individuals to the relevance of information, may choose to tailor materials 
and tasks for a client to help her/him understand that these materials are of particular importance to 
her/him. Individualizing treatment materials is important for all clients, but is likely to be 
particularly important for clients who lack epistemic trust.  Examples of individualizing therapy 
materials include: allowing a young client to decorate her/his therapy book, using stories in which a 
character has the same name as the client, or using activities that reflect the client’s day-to-day 
activities.  Further, the clinician’s decision-making in choosing specific materials for individual 
clients, should be made explicit to the client. An example of emphasizing the relevance of therapy 
for older children and adults includes the use of collaborative goal-setting, in particular, developing 
shared goals and taking care to explain why a specific program was selected for that individual.  
The importance of collaboration and cooperative goal-setting in fostering trust between clients and 
clinicians has been well-described in the literature (Campbell & Simmonds, 2011; McAndrew, 
Chambers, Nolan, Thomas, & Watts, 2014; Pinto et al., 2012).  
      The fourth communication behavior which is thought to support epistemic trust is the use of 
mentalizing language by caregivers. As discussed in earlier sections, mentalization underpins both 
epistemic trust and pragmatic language skills and, thus, therapy targeting mentalization offers the 
SLP an opportunity to assist clients in two critical psychosocial domains. When working with very 
young children, SLPs may choose to focus on supporting caregivers to increase caregivers’ use of 
mentalizing language, that is, language that describes emotions, wishes, and beliefs.  In an earlier 
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section,  empirical evidence supporting a relationship between a caregiver’s use of mentalizing 
language and children’s acquisition of language and mentalization was described (Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008).  Thus, SLPs may choose to support parents to use 
mentalizing language with their young children, which may promote the child’s use of language, 
particularly language involved in mentalizing.       
A SLP applying an understanding of mentalization may also choose to emphasize conversation 
in therapy sessions. Research has demonstrated that children’s ToM/mentalization skills can be 
improved through engaging in conversation about mental states (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 
2012; Fernández, 2011; Gavazzi & Ornaghi, 2011; Lecce, Bianco, Devine, Hughes, & Banerjee, 
2014). For example, Lecce et al. (2014) assigned 91 typically-developing, nine- and ten-year olds to 
either an intervention group or a control group.  In the intervention group, participants discussed 
stories involving misunderstandings, where characters had different points of view. Participants 
were asked questions about characters’ mental states and about one character’s belief about another 
character’s belief.  In the control condition, children also heard stories, but instead of questions 
about mental states, questions related to details of the story or physical inferences.  At post-test, 
children from the intervention group showed significantly greater improvements in ToM tasks than 
children in the control group.  A SLP working with children in states of epistemic mistrust may 
choose to incorporate conversation about storybook characters’ emotions and points of view, or 
language games which encourage discussion of mental state language, that is, words describing 
thoughts and feelings.  In the authors’ experience, promoting adolescent and adult clients’ 
mentalizing capacity may involve discussing clients’ everyday experiences, helping clients to 
identify the mental states of both themselves and others, highlighting each person’s thoughts and 
feelings. 
      The overall aim of speech-language therapy is not merely improvement in language and 
mentalization skills, however.  The ultimate goal is for improved language and mentalization to 
enable an individual to better understand and describe both his/her own and others’ internal worlds, 
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leading to easier and more satisfying interactions with others. In a virtuous cycle (in which each 
event has a positive effect on the next), easier social interaction with significant others, may, over 
time, diminish an individual’s epistemic mistrust and lead to improved epistemic trust. In turn, 
improving epistemic trust could support further engagement with others, permitting more 
opportunities for the development of language and mentalization skills (see Fonagy & Allison, 2014, 
for further discussion of the impact of improved mentalizing on one’s comprehension of social 
situations leading to more trusting interpersonal relationships.) 
      In summary, there is emerging literature considering ways in which clinicians might support the 
development of epistemic trust in therapeutic settings (Bevington et al., 2015; Bo et al., 2017a; Bo 
et al., 2017b; Fonagy & Allison, 2014).  It is suggested in this paper that SLPs may incorporate 
knowledge of four key communication behaviors into clinical practice in order to create a 
therapeutic environment which supports clients in states of epistemic mistrust with the aim of 
fostering language, mentalization, and epistemic trust.  It is anticipated that increasing epistemic 
trust will, in turn, lead to improved ability to engage with and learn from others, particularly about 
the social world, enhancing clients’ psychosocial and educational outcomes.  These claims now 
warrant dedicated research attention. 
      In an earlier section, an association between language and epistemic trust was proposed, based 
on known associations with attachment and mentalization.  If a link between language and 
epistemic trust is established, SLPs will need to identify which language-impaired clients may also 
have difficulties with attachment, and/or mentalization, which may, in turn, suggest difficulties with 
epistemic trust. This assessment has not been routine in general SLP practice; however, it may be 
more common in specific fields of practice, such as SLPs working in mental health services.  
Although the importance of concepts such as attachment and mentalization will vary between SLP 
caseloads, a basic awareness of these concepts may be beneficial to SLPs in many clinical settings. 
Factors which may alert a SLP to the possibility that a client has difficulties in the area of 
attachment and/or mentalization are now discussed. 
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     First, factors known to be associated with insecure attachment may include: inadequate 
caregiving (Camoirano, 2017; Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005), child 
maltreatment (Stronach et al., 2011), or stressors such as poverty and maternal depression in early 
childhood (Diener, Nievar, & Wright, 2003).  Insecure attachment has also been identified in 
individuals living with conditions, such as ASD (Rutgers et al., 2007), ADHD (Clarke, Ungerer, 
Chahoud, Johnson, & Stiefel, 2002), or psychosis (Harder, 2014), and in individuals born 
prematurely (González-Serrano et al., 2012) or with congenital disorders (Barnett et al., 2006). 
     Second, factors commonly associated with impaired acquisition of ToM/mentalization skills may 
include: insecure attachment (Fonagy, Campbell, & Bateman, 2017), or having a clinical condition, 
such as SLI (Andrés-Roqueta et al., 2013; Nilsson & de López, 2016), ASD (Gökçen et al., 2016), 
or ADHD (Mary et al., 2016). Due to the inter-dependent relationship between pragmatic language 
functioning and mentalization (as outlined above), clients with pragmatic language difficulties are 
also likely to demonstrate poorer capacity with ToM/mentalization (Binz & Brüne, 2010). In 
summary, there are a number of factors which may cause a SLP to suspect that a client has insecure 
attachment and/or difficulties with mentalization. Depending on the clinical setting, a SLP may 
choose to explore these concerns further, which may include referring clients and/or their families 
to appropriate support services. 
 
8. Recommendations for research 
      At the present time, there is no research into the direct associations between epistemic trust and 
the development and use of language. In addition, little research has considered how marked 
mirroring, contingent responsiveness, ostensive cues, and mentalizing language may be used to 
foster epistemic trust in older children, adolescents, and adults. Future research should, first, 
investigate the association between language acquisition and use and the development of epistemic 
trust. Second, research should address what roles, if any, that attachment and mentalizing play in an 
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association between language and epistemic trust. Third, further investigations are needed into 
outcomes for SLP clients from the use of the four communication behaviors in therapy. 
 
9. Concluding comments 
      Epistemic trust is fundamental to an individual’s ability to learn about the social world from 
others (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; Luyten & Fonagy, 2016).  An individual with epistemic mistrust, 
or the more severe epistemic hypervigilance, is less able to readily incorporate information and 
experiences from those around them, limiting the quality of interpersonal relationships (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014), educational attainment (Durkin & Shafto, 2016), and potentially the therapeutic 
relationship and clinical improvement in SLP. In this paper, epistemic trust has been defined and 
contextualized within the early parent-child attachment relationship. The authors have described 
four attachment-related communication behaviors and their roles in the development of epistemic 
trust.  These communication behaviors were also suggested as means by which SLPs may manage 
clients’ epistemic mistrust with the ultimate goal of creating a virtuous cycle involving improved 
language and mentalization skills, increased social engagement, and improved epistemic trust.  
      This paper presented three arguments to support a relationship between language and epistemic 
trust. It was explained that epistemic trust may be a clinical concern for individuals with insecure 
attachment, for individuals who have experienced child maltreatment, and for individuals with 
deficits in mentalizing.  These arguments may encourage SLPs to consider epistemic trust when 
working with individuals for whom these concerns are relevant. The lack of direct research into the 
relationship between language and epistemic trust highlights the need for further study to clarify the 
association between language comprehension and use, mentalizing skills, and the formation of 
epistemic trust. Gaining this understanding may provide opportunities for SLPs to develop 
frameworks and interventions which assist clients in states of epistemic mistrust to improve their 
capacity to trust others and engage more easily with the world around them.
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Figure 1 
Proposal regarding the complex inter-relationships between language, attachment, mentalization, 
and epistemic trust. (Known associations are depicted by solid lines. The proposed association 
between epistemic trust and language is depicted by a broken line.)   
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